To curtail irregular immigration, Global North countries increasingly externalize their migration controls, promoting movement restrictions along transit corridors. Proponents claim that restrictive controls discourage migrants from continuing onward, reducing overall immigrant inflows. We argue that this conventional wisdom neglects the possibility that externalization policies may produce backfire effects because restrictive conditions in transit-states drive individuals who would have otherwise remained in these countries toward Global-North host states. We study these dynamics in the context of the 2017 Italy-Libya migration deal. Using synthetic control methods, we find that the deal did not reduce migrant flows to Italy. Exploiting a survey that coincidentally sampled migrants in Libya before and after the deal, we study changes in migrant decisionmaking, and find the deal increased intentions to migrate to Italy. Our findings show that outsourcing border controls to transit-countries can backfire, pushing migrants to rush towards Global North destinations rather than back to origin countries.

Significant changes in social sciences often herald changes in legal theory, including in international legal theory. In light of the cognitive turn in social sciences, this volume seeks to explore the implications of this ‘turn’ for international legal theories. Cognitive and behavioural studies are making inroads into international law literature and international policy-making, yet their implications for international legal theory remain under-explored. The book aims to fill this gap by systematically analysing if, to what extent, and how insights gained from cognitive-behavioural sciences influence the principal theoretical approaches to international law. The chapters indicate that while insights drawn from cognitive and behavioural literature often underlie or complement some international legal theories, interactions between some legal theories and cognitive-behavioural studies are characterized by tensions. Exploring the implicit and explicit cognitive-behavioural assumptions of international legal theories has the potential to build bridges between these fields.

The electoral success of right-wing populist parties is often attributed to disaffection among certain voters. But while economic explanations for this disaffection are theoretically clear and quantifiable, explanations centered on cultural factors offer accounts that are more vague and harder to evaluate empirically. We address this problem by distinguishing theoretically between five different “storylines” about the cultural origins of populism and then test them using extensive data from Europe and the United States. Our analysis indicates that concerns about ethnocultural change induced by immigration are central to understanding the populist vote; so is rural resentment and status anxiety, but to a lesser extent. In contrast, explanations centered on community disintegration or an intergenerational values divide are pertinent in only specific cases. The analysis helps disentangle the cultural forces associated with the rise of populism and highlights the heterogeneous coalitions that form the populist base across different countries.

The article employs the theoretical framework of the humanitarian dilemma in the context of a political non-violent conflict. We analyse the conditions for the humanitarian dilemma where within the structure of mass media and well-established international human rights regime, actors – mainly human rights organisations seeking to identify human rights violations – can bring about the unintended and obverse consequences of escalating human right violations. We then focus on the political conflict that emerged between the European Union and Belarus, which resulted in the stranding of thousands of refugees in the border area between Poland and Belarus. We conclude by asking how to resolve, or at least moderate, the dilemma.

This policy analysis asks: what has caused and now sustains the violent escalation cycle that is re-defining the Middle East and how will this all end? It analyses Iran and Israel's grand strategies. It argues that both employ force to achieve strategic depth and both bifurcate the region into two blocs doomed to constantly fight for hegemony. Equally, they both share the same flaws. Israel and Iran alike prioritise conflict management over conflict resolution. But neither are effective are achieving this pessimistic goal. Concurrently, the ongoing conflict has precipitated a role reversal in Iran and Israel's regional visions. Israel is a traditionally a status quo power, whereas Iran has followed a revisionist grand strategy. However, it is Israel that is now the region's peremptory revisionist power. This is because the October 7 attacks have caused Israel to no longer tolerate hostile actors on its borders. Equally, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seeks a1967 moment: a regional reordering in Israel's favour. Conversely, Iran is now an increasingly status quo power; it seeks a cease-fire in the current conflict because it feels that it is losing and needs to preserve its regional assets.

How do populists approach regional integration from the government? Existing research shows that a rhetoric backlash against regional organizations and their bureaucracies is central to contemporary populist leaderships, which increasingly project the ideational antagonism between ‘the people’ and ‘the elites’ onto the regional level. However, the various ways in which populists engage with regionalism when in power and controlling foreign policy apparatuses remain disputed. This study develops a typological framework that addresses both the sign of populist governments in legitimizing or delegitimizing regionalist processes and the magnitude of the efforts devoted to this purpose. Combining the two variables, this article charts four different paths of populist regionalism (a-regionalism, anti-regionalism, pro-regionalism, and para-regionalism), which are illustrated through examples from Europe and Latin America. The findings of this study elucidate common and varied elements in the strategic approach of populists in power towards regional (dis)integration, contributing to the emerging scholarly engagement with the multi-level effects of populism in Europe, the Americas, and beyond.

For decades, US–Israel relations survived and thrived at least partly because of the two states’ commitment to the regional status quo. In 2020, the Trump administration’s promotion of the Abraham Accords demonstrated its ideological sympathy with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing government and reinforced Israel’s determination to pressure the Palestinians to relinquish their sovereign ambitions. Hamas’s 7 October 2023 attacks have hardened Israel’s revisionist inclinations, and the Biden administration was unable to meaningfully restrain it in Gaza or keep it from expanding regional hostilities. As a result, formerly revisionist Iran has essentially become a status quo power. The current Trump administration is likely to acquiesce to Israeli excesses, partly in the hope that Israel will counterbalance Iran. Now with compatible revisionist agendas, Israel and the United States will continue their special relationship, potentially seeking drastic change rather than relative stability.

This article challenges common misconceptions about the fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. It debunks the notion of a simplistic rebel/regime dichotomy and instead delineates the diversity of actors and interests in a post-Assad Syria. It also critiques the perception that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham won a decisive battlefield victory and illustrates that this was as much a political triumph as it was a military one. It then assesses how genuine the group's transformation from jihadist to pragmatist really is. Further, it shows any claims that Russia and Iran will leave Syria are unrealistic, while Israel's role in the country is often misunderstood. It concludes by critiquing the assertion that the international community has no good options in Syria and should therefore stay away. Instead, it advocates cautious engagement with the new regime. Overall, the analysis highlights Syria's complex power dynamics and warns against oversimp-lifications in devising policies for Syria's post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation.

How are international mediators depicted in the local cultural products of the parties to a conflict? Over the years, scholars have examined the question of parties’ attitudes toward mediators and the resulting impact on the effectiveness of mediation efforts. This article extends that inquiry, proposing an approach that uses the local cultural context as a prism by which to study how international mediators are represented in local cultural products of the parties in a conflict zone, such as plays, songs, and television shows. The study analyzes representations of international mediators in Israeli cultural products in the context of the Israeli–Arab and Israeli–Palestinian conflicts, and identifies four main narrative themes: (1) the mediator as useless and incompetent; (2) the mediator as arrogant and self-interested; (3) the mediator as a superhero; and (4) the mediator as the only “responsible adult” taking on a thankless mission. In addition, it examines how varying conditions can shape different cultural images of mediators in various cases. The research contributes to the literature on international mediation, and the intersection of International Relations and popular culture, and particularly the cultural reflection and images of conflicts and peacemaking.

This article examines how populism reconfigures diplomacy. We contend that populist leaders practice a new form of diplomacy, i.e., champion diplomacy, which poses significant problems for negotiating and implementing international agreements. Portraying themselves as championing the causes of the people in its supposed struggle against the elites, champion diplomats sideline career diplomats, use simple and often coarse language, and prefer direct public diplomatic encounters, often on social media, over more traditional diplomatic channels. This complicates getting to the negotiation table, makes it more difficult to come up with meaningful agreements, and causes problems for implementing them. Our empirical research of two cases, US nuclear diplomacy towards North Korea and the Abraham Accords between Israel as well as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrein, Morocco and Sudan provides strong evidence for our claims. Our findings have important implications for diplomacy and international order more generally. With populist practices increasingly diffusing in diplomatic conduct, even beyond non-populist leaders, concluding workable agreements among states becomes more and more difficult.