While some studies show ideological asymmetry in outgroup bias between rightists and leftists, those studies often target an ideologically biased outgroup. Here, we bypass this issue by targeting the ideological outgroups (rightists for leftists, and leftists for rightists). We rely on a magnetoencephalography-based approach delineating function-specific neural mechanisms to test for ideological asymmetries at multiple levels: explicit psychological self-reports, implicit behavioral bias, and neural oscillations. Using a computational model balancing the stimuli and screening 81 rightists and leftist Israeli individuals, we find ideological asymmetry with rightists being more biased at all three levels. Furthermore, the neural results add important insights by uncovering two underlying mechanisms: The first (late beta-band motor activity) is strongly associated with implicit behavior, while the second (early alpha-band dorsal anterior cingulate activity) reveal an antileftist bias for both groups. We discuss implications of the findings on bias, ideological asymmetry, their neural underpinnings, and social norms.

Since Eveland and Shah (2003) published their seminal study on the impact of social networks on media bias perceptions in the US, little has been researched about the interpersonal antecedents of hostile media perceptions. In this study we address this gap by investigating the role of safe, or like-minded, political discussions on individuals’ likelihood to perceive media as hostile. We use survey data from more than 5,000 individuals in Germany. Our findings reveal that like-minded discussions increase one’s likelihood to perceive media as hostile; yet, only among those more politically engaged and ideologically on the left. The significance and theoretical implications of the results are discussed in the concluding section.

Underrepresentation of women in politics is a matter of great concern to social scientists, citizens, and policymakers alike. Despite effort over the past decade to ameliorate it with gender quotas of different types, scientific research provides a mixed picture on the extent to which quotas can close these gender gaps under different conditions. We approach this puzzle by focusing on the orientation of electoral systems-candidate-centered vs. platform-centered-as a context that conditions the effect of quotas on representation. Our analyses of 76 countries' electoral rules and legislatures show that contrary to expectations, it is in candidate-oriented systems that quotas facilitate stronger effect on women's representation. Even after considering proportional representation, district magnitude, human development, or labor-force participation as alternative explanations, we show that quotas foster greater increases in gender representation in candidate-oriented systems. The broader implications are that in electoral systems that tend to have larger gender gaps, quotas have a substantial contribution to equal representation.

Theorists have long argued that discussing public affairs with others increases citizens’ knowledge of politics. Yet, empirical tests of this claim reach contradictory results, with some studies reporting large effects of discussion on knowledge while others report small effects or fail to confirm the hypothesis. To account for this inconsistency, the current study meta-analyzes this literature. The results, based on 163 research findings from 134 independent studies (N = 412,933), indicate positive and significant mean effect sizes of r = .15 for discussion frequency, r = .1 for discussion heterogeneity, and r = .18 for discussion network size. While all three effects are statistically significant, a meta-analytic relative weights analysis reveals that discussion heterogeneity explains little variance in political knowledge once discussion frequency and network size have been accounted for. In other words, how much citizens talk about politics matters much more than whom they talk to.

There is a considerable body of work across the social sciences suggesting negativity biases in human attentiveness and decision-making. Recent research suggests that individual variation in negativity biases is correlated with political ideology: persons who have stronger physiological reactions to negative stimuli, this work argues, hold more conservative attitudes. However, such results have mostly been encountered in the United States. Does the link between psychophysiological negativity biases and political ideology apply elsewhere? We answer this question with the most extensive cross-national psychophysiological study to date. Respondents across 17 countries and six continents were exposed to negative and positive televised news reports and static images. Sensors tracked participants’ skin conductance, and a survey captured their left–right political orientation. Analyses performed at three levels of aggregation—respondent-as-a-case, stimuli-as-a-case, and second-by-second time-series—fail to find strong support for the link between negativity biases and political ideology.

Previous research shows that power-sharing political systems are associated with (a) individual perceptions of political inclusiveness and (b) a more deliberative news media supply. Little, however, is known about the effect of this institutional feature on exposure to crosscutting views through the media. We posit that political systems provide different degrees of institutional power and public visibility to political parties and minorities, and this difference affects crosscutting news exposure. Survey data from three countries ( N = 5,500 individuals) show that media contribute more to crosscutting exposure in a consensus system (Italy) than a polarized pluralist variant of majoritarianism (Spain), or a hegemonic illiberal democracy (Mexico). Additionally, analyses reveal that minority views are positively correlated with crosscutting media exposure in a consensus system and a polarized pluralist variant of majoritarianism, but not in a hegemonic system. These findings suggest that certain political system characteristics can override the tendency for selective exposure.

What accounts for the prevalence of negative news content? One answer may lie in the tendency for humans to react more strongly to negative than positive information. “Negativity biases” in human cognition and behavior are well documented, but existing research is based on small Anglo-American samples and stimuli that are only tangentially related to our political world. This work accordingly reports results from a 17-country, 6-continent experimental study examining psychophysiological reactions to real video news content. Results offer the most comprehensive cross-national demonstration of negativity biases to date, but they also serve to highlight considerable individual-level variation in responsiveness to news content. Insofar as our results make clear the pervasiveness of negativity biases on average, they help account for the tendency for audience-seeking news around the world to be predominantly negative. Insofar as our results highlight individual-level variation, however, they highlight the potential for more positive content, and suggest that there may be reason to reconsider the conventional journalistic wisdom that “if it bleeds, it leads.”

The use of psychophysiological measures has been relatively common in the study of communication; there has been a recent increase in interest among political behavioralists as well. There has nevertheless been a limited body of work that uses psychophysiological measures to better understand the impact of political mass media content. This article presents the case for using psychophysiological measures to study political communication. Focusing on skin conductance, it outlines the advantages of this measure for capturing subconscious responses to media over time, second-to-second. It then presents results from recent experimental work in the United States that highlights individual-level variation in responsiveness to negative versus positive news content—variation that is correlated with measures of psychophysiological reactions to non-news content, suggesting the relevance of deep-seated predispositions in psychophysiological research on media effects.

Previous studies show that individual political interest is an antecedent of news media exposure, particularly of exposure to differing views. Nevertheless, little is known about this effect from a comparative perspective: How do media institutions affect the relationship between political interest and exposure to cross-cutting viewpoints? One institutional feature that varies between countries is the ownership of broadcast media. This study investigates the extent to which the relative dominance of public service broadcasting alters the relationship between political interest and non-like-minded, or cross-cutting, news media exposure across 27 European Union countries. The analyses employ survey data from 27,079 individuals and media content from 48,983 news stories. The results confirm that the extent to which political interest contributes to cross-cutting exposure is contingent on the strength of public service broadcasting. The stronger the broadcaster, the smaller the gaps between the most and least politically engaged individuals.

Objective

Studies show that public service broadcasters narrow knowledge gaps between politically interested and disinterested because such contexts encourage incidental learning. This reasoning, however, fails to explain why gendered knowledge differences persist in environments that equalize learning. Using stereotype threat theory, I argue that news content emits symbolic gender cues that encourage or discourage women to become politically informed.

Methods

Employing European Election Study 2009 voter data (N = 27,000), and multilingual news content analyses from 27 E.U. member states, I test whether more egalitarian representation of women as newsmakers correlates with narrower gaps between men and women.

Results

Aggregate and multilevel models show that greater representation of women as newsmakers correlates with smaller gaps in news exposure and political knowledge. Analyses also consider competing explanations such as women's electoral representation, education, labor force participation, and knowledge item guessing rates.

Conclusion

Findings support the theoretical expectations regarding symbolic cues and knowledge gaps.