This paper argues that works of popular culture, specifically horror films, offer valuable insights into dominant and critical perceptions of the sources of violence in ongoing armed conflicts—an issue of concern for scholars of International Relations (IR) scholars, which as yet has not received sufficient attention. Accordingly, we present a new approach that IR scholars can utilize in their analysis of works of popular culture, applying it to two recent horror films from Israel/Palestine: Cannon Fodder (2013, dir. Eitan Gafny) and Freak Out (2015, dir. Boaz Armoni). The analysis of these films, combined with a discussion of films dealing with violence from other contexts, reveals how works of popular culture in general, and horror films in particular, can help address the question of whether violence in armed conflicts is perceived as endogenous or exogenous to the groups involved. This can also shed light on specific issues, such as the connection between social representation and violence, the link between the use of military technology and violence, and the blurred boundaries between endogenous and exogenous sources of violence.

This chapter discusses Israel's policy in and toward the West Bank (and East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip from the Six-Day War (1967), when Israel occupied these areas, to the present. Although the focus here is on the political-security realm, other spheres (eg, economic, social, and cultural-discursive) are also addressed. The first part of the chapter discusses Israel's policy in and vis-à-vis the Territories in the first decade after 1967, which in retrospect was the policy's formative period. It then examines the four decades that followed, identifying elements of continuity and change in Israel's policy. This is followed by a discussion of the major challenges to Israel's policy since 1967: the first Palestinian intifada, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the second intifada, and Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. The concluding section tries to assess the cumulative impact of Israel's policy in and toward the Territories.

Ian Lustick, a prominent political scientist from the University of Pennsylvania, is a long-time observer of Israel and its conflict with the Palestinians. In his new book, he argues that the "paradigm" of the "Two-State Solution (TSS)" to the Israeli—Palestinian conflict, predicated on the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside the State of Israel, is no longer relevant. Instead, he calls for acknowledging the "One-State Reality (OSR)" in Israel/ Palestine, namely, that "there is today one and only one state ruling the territory between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, and its name is Israel" (p. 2).

This paper argues that autonomous militaries can play a balancing role during major internal political crises. However, when militaries’ autonomy is curtailed by political leaders before the crisis, militaries cannot maintain the political balance between rulers and opponents, thereby increasing the risk of armed conflict. The paper first explains the main concepts relevant to the discussion (autonomy; political crisis; balancing role), exploring their possible inter-linkages and presenting several hypotheses. Subsequently, it discusses four relevant cases from the Middle East before and during the Arab revolts of 2010–2011: Egypt in 2011 and Lebanon in 1958, which demonstrate the balancing capacities of autonomous militaries during major political crises, and Lebanon in 1975 and Syria in 2011, which reveal that non-autonomous militaries cannot play a balancing role in such circumstances. The paper concludes with several observations regarding the military’s balancing role during major internal political crises in divided and homogenous states.

For many decades, cultural representations of the military and military service in Israel, particularly in films and television series, tended to focus on male Sabra (Israeli-born) soldiers and their combat experiences, portraying them from either a ‘heroic-nationalist’ or a ‘post-heroic’ perspective. However, several recent Israeli films and television series bring to the fore men and women from different social backgrounds who serve as non-combatant soldiers (jobniks) far behind the frontlines. Such depictions of ‘anti-heroic’ soldiers expose previously underrepresented aspects of service in the Israeli military, ranging from subtle expressions of a lack of motivation to open acts of resistance. Based on an analysis of several notable films and television series featuring jobnik protagonists, we argue that although these works give voice to previously underrepresented social groups and accord legitimacy to soldiers’ acts of resistance, they simultaneously foster a more conservative discourse regarding military service in Israel by excluding other social groups and setting limits on individuals’ conduct within and outside the military. These findings suggest that while popular culture can challenge militarist tendencies, it may ultimately reinforce the military’s position as the ‘people’s army’ and the social norm of mandatory conscription.

Since Lebanon’s independence in the mid-1940s, its military—the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)—has played a pivotal role in the country’s politics. The political role of the LAF in Lebanon might seem surprising since the Lebanese state did not militarize, and its political leaders have continuously managed to keep their military relatively weak and small. Indeed, in this respect Lebanon has been markedly different from its close neighbors (Syria and Israel), but also from several other Middle Eastern states (especially Egypt and Iraq), where the military, which was large and powerful, was continuously involved in politics. Additionally, both Lebanon and the LAF have persistently striven to distance themselves from regional conflicts since 1949, particularly in relation to the Palestinian issue, albeit not always successfully. Still, and despite these ostensibly unfavorable factors for the military’s involvement in politics in Lebanon, the LAF has played an important political role in the state since its independence. This role, which has been marked by elements of continuity and change over the years, included mediation and arbitration between rival political factions (in 1945–1958, 2008, 2011, and 2019); attempts to dominate the political system (in 1958–1970 and 1988–1990); intervention in the Lebanese civil war (in 1975–1976 and 1982–1984); attempts to regain its balancing role in politics (in 1979–1982 and 1984–1988); and facilitating the state’s postwar reconstruction (since 1991). The political role of the military in Lebanon can be explained by several factors. First, the weakness of Lebanon’s political system and its inability to resolve crises between its members. Second, Lebanon’s divided society and its members’ general distrust towards its civilian politicians. Third, the basic characteristics of Lebanon’s military, which, in most periods, enjoyed broad public support that cuts across the lines of community, region, and family, and found appeal among domestic and external audiences, which, in their turn, acquiesced to its political role in the state.

This paper traces the significant change that has occurred in the balance between offense and defence in Israel’s ‘hybrid’ military strategy in recent decades. Relying on fresh materials concerning the organizational, doctrinal, and procurement processes of Israel’s military, we identify a shift from offense towards defence as the preferred way to protect Israel in the face of new security threats. We also show that due to rapidly changing security challenges, limited resources, and the military’s organizational culture, this change has been gradual, incremental, improvised, and largely informal. We propose that similar changes may characterize other states facing new security challenges.

Since 1948, when the Israeli military--the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)--was established, women have been conscripted into the IDF and have served in various positions within its ranks. However, two prominent Israeli sociologists, Edna Lomsky-Feder and Orna Sasson-Levy, argue in their most recent book that the inclusion of women in the Israeli military should be further explored through these women's "gendered, embodied and emotional military experience" (3), shifting the focus to the ways in which women soldiers have been and remain "outsiders within" (9) the Israeli military. Additionally, the authors ask how these soldiers' formative experiences in various positions within this gendered institution ultimately shape not only their perspectives regarding their role within the military but also their relationship with the Israeli state more generally.

Since 1946, when the Israeli military—the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)—was established, women have been conscripted into the IDF and have served in various positions within its ranks. However, two prominent Israeli sociologists, Edna Lomsky-Feder and Orna Sasson-Levy, argue in their most recent book that the inclusion of women in the Israeli military should be further explored through the women's "gendered, embodied and emotional military experience" (3), shifting the focus to the ways in which women soldiers have been and remain "outsiders within" (9) the Israeli military. Additionally, the authors ask how the soldiers' forma-tive experiences in various positions within this gendered institution ultimately shape not only their perspectives regarding their role within the military but also their relationship with the Israeli state more generally.

This article argues that part of the reason why some Middle Eastern states remain democratically challenged is the emergence, operation, and political influence of “security networks” and “deep states” — informal actors in the area of national security. The article explains what these actors are, situates them in a broad theoretical and comparative perspective, assesses their impact on democratic development, and provides examples from Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, and Egypt.