In this chapter, we develop a comprehensive typology, alongside measurements of personalism and collegialism, of cabinets and governments in democracies. The scholarly literature identifies and addresses the personal and collegial elements within governments in democracies, but falls short of proposing a comprehensive typology and compatible measurements. We present what we call the Cabinet-Government Model, which includes two perspectives: a narrow one that focuses on the cabinet and a wider one that also relates to the interaction of the cabinet with other political institutions (parliament, election, bureaucracy, party) and thus refers to the government as a whole. After listing the ideal types of collegial and personal governments, we chart its measurements. We then analyze 28 democratic governments using materials from various databases and constitutional sources. The analysis identifies a high level of variation in personalism between cabinets and governments throughout the democratic world, demonstrates that a focus on the cabinet alone is not sufficient for capturing levels of personalism of governments, and paints a more nuanced picture than the hitherto-simple categorization of parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential governments.

This book assesses the larger influences that government termination by parliaments has on executive–legislative relations, claiming that the way in which the governments may be challenged or dismissed has far greater impact than previously understood. The core feature of a parliamentary system is not that governments tend to emerge from the legislatures in some way or another, but their political responsibility to this body. While in only some parliamentary systems the government needs formal support of parliament to take office, in all parliamentary systems no government can survive against the will of parliament. The academic literature related to the rules for how governments form is vast. Strikingly, scholars have paid far less time to unpack the core institution of parliamentary systems of government – the confidence relationship and the various no confidence procedures. The chapters explore the institutions by which parliaments hold governments accountable and how they balance elected parliaments and appointed governments in parliamentary systems. Contributions move beyond the standard focus on government formation and instead analyse government termination by parliament evaluating its consequences in a detailed and comprehensive manner. This book will be of interest to students and academics in the field of political science, governance and political theory. The chapters in this book were originally published in West European Politics.

The core feature of a parliamentary system is not that governments tend to emerge from the legislatures in some way or another but their political responsibility to this body. While in only some parliamentary systems the government needs formal support of parliament in order to take office, in all parliamentary systems no government can survive against the will of parliament. The academic literature related to the rules for how governments form is vast. Strikingly, scholars have paid far less time to unpack the core institution of parliamentary systems of government – the confidence relationship and the various no confidence procedures. Placing the focus on how the parliament can hold the government accountable, this book assesses the larger influences legislative confidence has on executive–legislative relations and improves our understanding of the ways in which the executive may be challenged or dismissed.

The core feature of parliamentary democracy is government responsibility to the legislature. The most important instrument by which parliament can express its lack of support for the government is the vote of no confidence. This mechanism remains significantly under-studied, and research on votes of no confidence calls out for systematic attention. It is also timely because parliamentary democracies are making it procedurally harder for parliament to terminate the government. Through developing and conceptualising a series of indicators that affect the relative ease with which parliament can challenge and terminate government, this study proposes the first ever framework for analysing votes of no confidence. It then empirically locates countries in the framework and discusses those that have shifted over time. The goal of this study is to begin to fill an academic lacuna concerning, arguably, the defining feature of parliamentary democracy.

The vote of no-confidence is the primary mechanism through which the principle of government accountability to the legislature – the defining feature of parliamentary democracy – is achieved. Yet, no research has been devoted to its influence on the relations between the government and the mechanism’s main users – the opposition. This article attempts to fill this lacuna by theorising how restrictiveness in the vote of no-confidence influences the opposition’s strategies vis-à-vis the government in legislative voting. We delineate the influence of the vote of no-confidence on the opposition via its preference to pursue more cooperative strategies, as opposed to conflictual ones, distinguishing between the two stages of the vote of no-confidence – initiating and voting. We empirically explore the relation between the vote of no-confidence and the voting behaviour of 59 opposition parties in 16 countries, showing that greater restrictions on both stages of the vote of no-confidence correlate with less conflictual opposition behaviour.

Israel has a unicameral legislature called the Knesset, and is a parliamentary democracy. After independence in 1948, the first Knesset was elected in 1949. Since there have been 24 elections. The 25th Knesset was elected on 1 November 2022. In Israel’s first 70 years there were 20 elections, which means that on average a parliamentary election was held every 3½ years, out of a maximum term of office of four years. However, in the last 3½ years there have been no less than five parliamentary elections. This article begins by explaining the three main features of the Israeli electoral system, it then elaborates how the seats in Israel are distributed, what then follows is a delineation of the party blocs in the party system, and subsequently an analysis of the 2022 elections alongside a short explanation of why Israel went through five elections in 3½ years – an unparalleled series of elections in any established democracy.

Israel is a parliamentary democracy with a highly divided society. Numerous political parties represent the many social groups (e.g., Jews and Arabs, secular and religious) in its complex society and compete for parliamentary seats in general elections that see on average a dozen parties win seats. The highly proportional electoral system – in which the whole country serves as a single, nationwide electoral district – translates Israel’s divided society into an extreme multiparty system. This produces, in turn, governments that are based on multiparty coalitions. Yet while political power is horizontally dispersed among many political parties, it is vertically concentrated in the hands of a unitary and highly centralized national government.

The core feature of a parliamentary system is not that governments tend to emerge from the legislatures in some way or another, but their political responsibility to this body. While in only some parliamentary systems the government needs formal support of parliament in order to take office, in all parliamentary systems no government can survive against the will of parliament. The academic literature related to the rules for how governments form is vast. Strikingly, scholars have paid far less attention to unpacking the core institution of parliamentary systems of government – the confidence relationship and the various no confidence procedures. Placing the focus on how the parliament can hold the government accountable, this special issue assesses the larger influences legislative confidence has on executive–legislative relations, and improves our understanding of the ways in which the executive may be challenged or dismissed.

When the past is contested by political actors, it can play a notable role both in present and in future politics. This is especially true when it comes to the memory of dominant parties, which are part and parcel of political and national history. Focusing on dominant parties in parliamentary democracies, this article examines the memory dynamics of a dominant party after its demise and highlights the importance of memory modes in understanding these dynamics. Using theories of collective memory, it identifies four possible modes of memory in a post-dominance era, suggesting discursive and power-related indications for each mode. The article then utilizes this framework to examine the memory of Mapai, the once-dominant party in Israel. On the basis of this analysis, the authors propose hypotheses concerning the comparative cases of Sweden, Italy, and Japan.

Few countries receive as much attention as Israel and are at the same time as misunderstood. The Oxford Handbook of Israeli Politics and Society brings together the leading Israeli and international figures in order to offer the most wide-ranging treatment available of an intriguing country. This chapter tackles the issue of Israeli exceptionalism, arguing against those who shy away from assessing Israel in a comparative perspective—whether for reasons of complexity or because of a political agenda. Israel is indeed different, for many reasons, but it possesses enough similarities in its democratic political institutions and social makeup that to truly understand the country, scholars need to employ a comparative analytical perspective. The chapter argues that Israeli politics and society are comparable, that comparison will improve the ability to assess Israel, and that Israel can contribute to theory building and testing in comparative politics. The chapter then outlines the sections and summarizes the main features of each chapter in this handbook.