In the aftermath of the 1967 war, the left–right distinction was based on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict – dovish versus hawkish positions. However, over the last decade there has been a gradual transformation resulting in a new classification: liberal versus conservative. The conservative side, representing the national camp, narrates itself as a Zionist counter-revolution against the constitutional revolution supposedly led by the Supreme Court since the 1992 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom was legislated. All currents of the Israeli right – the ultraorthodox, the settlers, the “anti-infiltrators”, the traditionalists and nationalists – identify with the national-conservative camp. Yet, none of these currents, this chapter argues, is conservative in a classic way; if anything, they are all revolutionaries. The dilemma of the neoconservatives was the following: how to disentangle the national-liberal Israeli right wing from its political liberalism, and to constitute liberalism as the enemy of the national camp? Changing Jewishness back from a national to a religious approach, and cementing the camp against the Supreme Court were two main vehicles. This amounts to rolling back the (national) Zionist revolution and leading a constitutional coup d’état. Its consequences for Israeli democracy are still in the balance.

Democracy is backsliding in Europe and around the world as citizens’ trust in elected representatives and institutions wanes. Representation theories and studies have mostly centred on the representatives, rather than the represented. But how do citizens perceive political representation? Are their perceptions of any consequence at all? In this paper, we set forth a framework of representation in the eyes of citizens, based on Pitkin’s classic concept of representation in conjunction with Weissberg’s distinction between dyadic and collective representations. We use Israel as a proof of concept for our theoretical framework, employing an original set of survey items. We find that, in keeping with Pitkin’s framework, citizens perceive representation as multidimensional and depreciate the descriptive and symbolic—the standing-for—dimensions. Furthermore, citizens’ democratic attitudes are shaped by collective representation by the parliament rather than by dyadic representation by an elected representative. We conclude with a call for a greater focus on representation from the citizens’ standpoint.

This study explores the prioritization of urban identity over national identity in the context of the global city. Scholars have extensively discussed the fragmentation of national identity among individuals in the globalized world, and the relative proliferation of other communal identities, whether more cosmopolitan or place-based. As globalization gradually erodes the cultural distinctiveness of nation states, cities are revealed as arenas within which inhabitants nurture a particular collective character, which is used as an attractive source of local, communal belonging. Global cities, in particular, are a compelling case to inquire into the interplay between national and urban identity. Due to their relative independence vis-à-vis the state, the global city can promote the values shared by inhabitants while constituting significant competition for nation-based self-determination and providing a unique source of urban identity that is simultaneously cosmopolitan and place-based.

In this paper we ask whether city-zens living in highly globalized cities are more likely to prioritize their urban identity over their national identity. Utilizing the GaWC Index of cities’ globalization levels, we analyze the results of an original survey conducted among residents of six European cities: Paris, Madrid, Barcelona, Berlin, Utrecht and Glasgow. Our empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that in globalized cities a higher level of globalism accords with a more explicit tendency to prioritize urban identity over national identity. In conclusion, we interpret this evidence as an identities trade-off that challenges the coexistence of urban and national identities within globalized cities, discussing its implications for future studies of contemporary politics.

Thomas Aquinas and most Christian theologians after him asserted that it is improper to attribute hatred to God. In 1598 the Jesuit theologian Gabriel Vázquez intrepidly argued that God can hate – not only with hatred of abomination but also with inimical hatred. Vázquez's surprising innovation is best explained in the context of the theological disputes between Jesuits and Dominicans on justification. Specifically, Vázquez is elaborating on the idea found in the Council of Trent that justification is a transition from enmity to friendship requiring a real change in the person being justified. He did so to counter views among Dominican theologians that this interior renewal could be in some way operated by God from the outside by way of a reconceptualisation of the sinner or a reevaluation of the value of his meritorious actions. These polemics drove Vázquez to rely on a robust, realist picture of friendship, based on the idea that affections must fit real qualities.

The last decade has given rise to substantial concern about democratic backsliding in the U.S. Manifestations include decreased trust in government, conspiratorial beliefs, contentious protests, and support for political violence. Surprisingly, prior work has not explored how these attitudes and behaviors relate to gun-buying, an action that provides people with the means to challenge the state. We address this topic by focusing on the unprecedented gun-buying surge during the COVID-19 pandemic. Using a survey with over 32,000 respondents, we find that—relative to pre-existing gun owners (who did not buy during the pandemic) and the non-gun-owning public—pandemic gun-buyers are more likely to distrust government, believe in conspiracies, protest, and support political violence. These anti-government views and protest behaviors are especially likely among those who bought guns for political reasons. Our findings highlight a crucial dynamic underlying the recent spike in gun sales with consequences for American democracy.

Affective polarization measures account for partisans’ feelings towards their own party versus its opponent(s), but not for how likely partisans are to encounter co-partisans versus out-partisans. However, the intensity of out-party dislike and the probability with which this comes into play both determine the social impact of cross-party hostility. We develop an affective fractionalization measure that accounts for both factors, and apply it to longitudinal survey data from 20 Western publics. From this perspective, countries with fewer dominant parties may be more harmonious because partisans have lower probabilities of interacting with political opponents. At the party level, partisans of smaller, more radical parties are particularly troubled because they strongly dislike out-partisans and have few co-partisans. Affective fractionalization has increased in most Western publics over time, primarily because of growing party-system fragmentation.

During the 1882 attempt under Ahmed Orabi to resist British control of Egypt, a European observer writing from London made the following skeptical assessment: “We know little about Orabi, but I am prepared to wager ten to one that he is an ordinary pasha who does not want to let the financiers collect the taxes because in good Oriental fashion he prefers to put the taxes in his own pocket. It is again the story of peasant countries from Ireland to Russia and from Asia Minor to Egypt… It seems to me you are defending the so-called National Party too much.”

Current studies of citizens’ coping behaviors in public encounters lack a direct examination of what citizens say and how they say it. Moreover, despite the ubiquity of citizens’ written communications with the state, such interactions are seldom studied. This article contributes a relational approach to studies of citizens’ coping behaviors by developing a taxonomy and detailed operationalization of citizens’ communication styles in written public encounters. This taxonomy is based on an abductive content analysis of over 1,000 citizen web contacts to an Israeli welfare agency, mostly during coronavirus disease 2019. We show that citizens’ written communications differ in their inclination to espouse demanding, pleading, civil, or neutral styles. Additionally, we tentatively show that citizens’ subjective experiences of administrative burdens and trust in government are correlated with the variation in their communication styles. The taxonomy, its operationalization, and preliminary findings open up new avenues for studying citizens’ coping behaviors in written encounters.

How do political activists’ protest strategies affect intergroup violence around friction points? Activists presume that their presence around checkpoints will protect the controlled population from humiliation and prevent the dominant force from engaging in violent or abusive behavior. However, depending on the protest strategy chosen, their presence may backfire and engender violence. We conducted a comprehensive content analysis of YouTube video clips featuring political activists at checkpoints between Israel and the West Bank over a 15-year period (2003–2018, n = 50, overall duration of 210 min) and examined how attributes of the protest (violent or nonviolent) and attributes of the activists (religious identity) influence the (apparent) emotions and behavior of the soldiers and Palestinians present. Results revealed that violent demonstrations by activists are associated with aggression and signs of anger among Israeli soldiers and with aggression (though at lower levels) and signs of humiliation among Palestinian civilians. The findings suggest that, despite the hope of political activists that their presence at checkpoints will have a positive effect on the treatment of Palestinian civilians, in practice, their presence may backfire if they employ a violent protest strategy. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved)

Media Storms, dramatic outbursts of attention to a story, are central components of media dynamics and the attention landscape. Despite their significance, there has been little systematic and empirical research on this concept due to issues of measurement and operationalization. We introduce an iterative human-in-the-loop method to identify media storms in a large-scale corpus of news articles. The text is first transformed into signals of dispersion based on several textual characteristics. In each iteration, we apply unsupervised anomaly detection to these signals; each anomaly is then validated by an expert to confirm the presence of a storm, and those results are then used to tune the anomaly detection in the next iteration. We demonstrate the applicability of this method in two scenarios: first, supplementing an initial list of media storms within a specific time frame; and second, detecting media storms in new time periods. We make available a media storm dataset compiled using both scenarios. Both the method and dataset offer the basis for comprehensive empirical research into the concept of media storms, including characterizing them and predicting their outbursts and durations, in mainstream media or social media platforms.