In their important book, Bell and Wang argue that hierarchies are here to stay, and the question moral philosophy should face is which hierarchies are morally condemnable and which are morally justifiable. They convincingly explain that hierarchies that contribute to social functioning and increase human well-being (often even benefitting those on the lower ranking of hierarchies) or hierarchies with a kind of fluid character and consist of mechanisms or rules that enable switching roles can be justified. In my paper, I wish to examine whether, according to their principles, informal and semi-formal hierarchies which are created by the market or by a firm, using an algorithm, can be justified. These hierarchies differ from the ones discussed by Bell and Wang in that they are not part of traditional or legal institutions or relationships. They are actually informal or semi-formal and are often created spontaneously by, or as a result of an aggregation of many individuals' economic exchanges. Sometimes they are publicized formally (e.g., a list of best sellers' authors, or when prizes are awarded) and sometimes they are simply a matter of the wisdom of the crowd. On the one hand hierarchies in markets are meant to (a) inform consumers and producers and (b) create a healthy competition, so, prima facie they help us and increase our well-being. In addition, they are meant to shift over time, as they depend on the quality of the producer and the product and their ability to compete with other, new, e.g., more technologically advanced, products. Therefore, on the face of it, these hierarchies could be justified according to Bell and Wang's theory. Nevertheless, I argue that there are other characteristics of these hierarchies which make them condemnable according to the theory and that the cons outweigh the pros. These are: (1) Market hierarchies are based on category mistakes; (2) Market hierarchies are likely to be deceptive—they might inform consumers but with deceptive and often irrelevant information; (3) Market hierarchies are not genuinely flexible and therefore work against the principle of shifting roles which Bell and Wang put forward.

The transgenerational community is based on moral similarity between contemporary and future people, referring to an ongoing moral deliberation across generations. It justifies obligations of justice towards the not yet born. Prioritarianism gives extra weight to the wellbeing of the least advantaged. I argue that both sentiments are egalitarian, and ask whether there is any tension between them. If we assume economic growth, and/or technological improvements and/or inflation, then prioritarianism prima facie implies that we should prefer to spend any dollar on today’s disadvantaged than on future generations, hence is in tension with the demands of the transgenerational community. Analyzing four ways of meeting this challenge, I argue that the two principles are not in tension.

When we think about equality in the city, we are very likely to think first of the wide and growing divide between rich and poor, in material terms. Yet when we think more about a 'city of equals' it becomes apparent that how people feel treated by the city and those around them, and whether they can live according to their values, are much more central. Accordingly, combining their own reflections, a multi-disciplinary literature review, and, distinctively, more than 180 interviews in 10 cities in 6 countries, Wolff and de Shalit have derived an account of a city of equals based on the idea that it should give each of its city-zens a secure sense of place or belonging. Four underlying values structure this account. First, access to the goods and services of the city should not be based purely on the market. Second, each person should be able to live a life they find meaningful. Third, there should be diversity and wide social mixing. Fourth, there should be 'non-deferential inclusion': each person should be able to get access to what they are entitled to without being treated as less worthy than others. They should be able to enjoy their rights without bowing and scraping, waiting longer than others, or going through special bureaucratic hurdles. In sum, in a city of equals each person is proud of their city and has the (justified) feeling that their city is proud of (people like) them.

This paper examines the reciprocal relationship between artists and cities by analyzing how cities influence artists' critical engagement. We hypothesize that a set of specific urban conditions suggests distinct forms of artistic engagement, which we call the artistic spirit of the city. Based on qualitative fieldwork in four cities in Germany and Israel, we explore how cities influence the self-perception, motivation, and practice of the artists who work and live in them. We found that artists are indeed highly influenced by the particular spirit or the intrinsic logic of the city in which they live and work, and they are embedded within the city's particular socio-political and spatial structures, which in turn influence their outlooks and visions as artistic city-zens.

How do critical artists intervene in urban space, and why? This question is explored in an interurban fieldwork study examining artistic interventions in four cities: Hanover and Hamburg in Germany, and Tel Aviv-Jaffa and Jerusalem in Israel. Grounded on a plethora of artistic interventions gathered in these cities, the article proposes a typology based on techniques, goals, sociability degrees and relations to urban space. On the one hand, urban artistic interventions vary from a compensatory improvement of social conditions to a highly political and protest-driven irritation of existing urban power structures and processes. On the other, the discourses behind the different modes of urban artistic intervention reveal similarities, bringing recurring concepts of “art in public space” to the forefront and referring to similar lines of reasoning which guide urban artists in their practice. This article extends the existing literature by offering a typology of artistic interventions in urban space, highlighting the critical agency of urban artists.

In my book, Cities and Immigration, I suggest shifting responsibilities for the integration of immigrants from the state to the city level. The articles in this issue challenge some of my suggestions. I discuss these challenges with regard to three questions: should a city enjoy greater autonomy to decide who, and how many, immigrants should settle within its borders? Should immigrants enjoy local voting rights even before naturalization? And is there a morally preferable model for integrating immigrants into the city?

How does theorizing of fundamental political concepts change when theoretical primacy is accorded to the social and institutional form of the city instead of the state? Given the changing and increasingly central role that cities play in private and social lives, this chapter suggests a reconsideration of the theoretical concepts commonly applied in analyzing cities’ political dynamics and the social relations therein. The overall rationale is that not only do the meanings of fundamental political concepts such as equality, liberty and democracy change over time, but they are also contingent upon the political unit and the institutions analyzed. Consequently, political and legal theory must not only examine the nature and importance of these concepts but principally indicate how they are modified when applied to the city. Thus, this chapter suggests that the time is ripe for scholars to consider the canon of political and legal philosophy vis-à-vis the city

Jonathan Wolff Avner de-Shalit The purpose of this chapter is to apply the framework set out in our earlier work Disadvantage (2007) to aspects of the COVID-19 crisis. By doing this we aim to highlight some key social vulnerabilities in a stark light, in order to aid thinking about how to prevent or remedy some of the worst inequalities that have been magnified in these most difficult times. In addition, it allows us to present a detailed case study to illustrate our earlier analysis and supplement the more general accounts we have presented before. In our previous work we proposed that disadvantage has multiple dimensions, and that it is quite possible, conceptually, to be relatively disadvantaged on one or more dimensions but not necessarily in others. Yet a key idea from our work is that a number of empirical mechanisms tend to ‘cluster’ different dimensions of disadvantage together.

In a democracy what people think matters. Political philosophers are mostly democrats. They often justify deliberative and participatory democracy. And yet when it comes to philosophizing they often turn a blind eye to what people think; they sometimes even express profound doubts about what people think and about consulting the public. I call this the political philosophy gap. It has been justified in several ways. In this paper I first consider and dismiss the most common justifications. I then suggest a democratic and an epistemological reason why political philosophers should consider what people think when they formulate their theories. I put forward a proposal for a method of doing so, which I call public reflective equilibrium, and which consists of four stages of research and philosophy. Finally, I suggest that not only is it doable, but it has a potential to contribute a lot to contemporary political philosophy. It should not come instead of traditional ways of conducting political philosophy but as an additional, perhaps more political, method of political philosophy.

I would like to begin by expressing my sincere and profound thanks to all those who suggested criticism and comments to my paper. As I write this reply, like many around the world, I am at home, in the bizarre situation that has been imposed on us by the Coronavirus pandemic; or, to be more precise, imposed by governments due to the Coronavirus pandemic. Various regulations are restricting our freedom of movement and other basic liberties. As governments issue increasing numbers of restrictions and even consider transferring more power to the executive branch, people all over the globe are debating whether governments should be so paternalistic in their policies. In my own country, Israel, the government was poised to close the parliament. Fortunately, spontaneous demonstrations and a quick intervention by the government's legal adviser prevented this from happening.