This essay delves into the humanitarian response of British Jews towards the suffering of the Armenians during the Hamidian massacres (1894–7). The essay argues that this humanitarian act is a very early and hardly known attempt by Jews to aid members of other non-Jewish groups. This “external” humanitarian act perhaps fits the scholarly argument concerning the nineteenth century’s watershed of humanitarianism: the transition from an earlier more inward-looking based relief action, to aiding, in the name of all humanity, other, distinct religious or ethnic groups. Most importantly, as this essay argues, these Jewish humanitarian activities mainly derived from rational, practical reasons, primarily resulting from Jewish vulnerability. Rational rather than sentimental humanitarianism, hence, was the main cause for the humanitarian response of British Jews. Indeed, the essay argues, the endorsement of the Armenians was an influential affair in Britain, moving the public as well as British Jews into action. However, some British Jews, and interestingly also German Jews objected to any formal or even non-formal support that might endanger their Jewish brethren in the Ottoman Empire. The support of the Armenians, thus, was also controversial, arousing inner conflicts within the community and even between British Jews and German Jews.

This paper presents an experiment testing a novel tool of urban participation. Its main idea is allowing individuals an opportunity to add expressions of their choice to the landscape of their city. Specifically, we sought to discover what would happen if people could present personal expressions on billboards.  Thanks to the sponsorship of the advertising company Wall GmbH, we had 1500 spots on billboards throughout Berlin at our disposal. We invited people in Berlin to submit contributions – in form of texts or images – they wished to present in the streets of the city. We did not have either pre-given topics or a jury – any content that did not violate the law or contain advertising was welcome.The experiment resulted in a colorful and diverse variety of content, including artworks, poems, photographs, and personal stories. In the surveys, the respondents reported that the participation in the experiment generated feelings of presence, community, and belonging. Observing others' contributions in the city, they learnt how diverse and creative their co-citizens were.We believe that the medium of individual speech could constitute a meaningful tool of urban participation and advance the residents' "right to the city."

Higher education organizations in countries where English is not the native tongue must function in a multilingual mode, using English as their primary language for scientific exchange and academic publication and relying on the native language for instruction and administration. When operating in a multilingual mode of communication and identity expression, a higher education organization runs the risk of becoming a “tower of Babel”; however, by operating solely in single-language mode, it may become an “ivory tower.” Investigating Israeli higher education organizations and focusing specifically on their mission statements, we analyzed the built-in tension of this multilingual self-identification through how they introduce themselves in the lingua franca of global academe, namely English, and in the local language, Hebrew. In our analysis, we found: (a) differences between the English- and Hebrew-language mission statements in length, style, and context; (b) differences in thematic emphases and thus in the narration of organizational identity; and (c) that such thematic differences patterned according to the three categories of state-mandated higher education organizations and, to some degree, time. We conclude that multilingualism serves both as an arena for the negotiation of organizational identity and as a state of being for higher education organizations in non-English-speaking countries.

The migration of images related to the visual history of the Holocaust occurs all the time. Even as one reads these lines, Holocaust images are migrating. One such image is the Number Tattoo, which has already established itself as a common visual trope of Auschwitz, or more precisely, of the figure of the survivor. Focusing on the ‘Auschwitz Tattoo’, and in particular on a sequence showing children presenting their number tattoos to a Soviet cameraman shortly after the camp’s liberation, this interactive visual research collection analyses the migration of this visual trope into popular culture: its historical origin, its iconisation process, and the reasons it has become such a popular object of visual migration. Emphasizing the movement of the trope between a representative selection of cultural products with the help of annotated images and sequences, as well as through explorative audiovisual essays, this collection reveals a network of visual relations that exist between the various uses of the image and offers new options for curating these relations by digital means.

This chapter explores what is original and distinctive of populist foreign policy in Latin America and what are the factors that enable and constrain it. The chapter proceeds as follows: first, we introduce the conceptual dimensions of populism and its more common use in terms of foreign policy analysis. This section also provides an eclectic analytical framework that captures the tradition of populism and its ability to shape the present (temporal dimension), how populists make sense of the international within their regions and in the global arena (spatial dimension), and the creative dimension of the populist leader (agential dimension). Second, we provide a historical contextualization of early populist experiences in Latin America and their key foreign policy principles and tradition. Third, we analyse the different waves of populism especially from the 1990s onwards along the lines of tradition, geopolitics, and leadership. Finally, we conclude with a comparison of the Latin American populist foreign policies in terms of commonalities and differences as well as we outline further research avenues.

This chapter examines the foreign policies of contemporary populist leaderships in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). We adopt a comparative regional approach to “populist foreign policy” (PFP) in MENA, seeking to identify commonalities and differences that distinguish PFP in these countries, as well as national and international factors that allow or limit these regional trends. We place special emphasis on four cases: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Turkey (2003–), which is probably the most “paradigmatic” case of contemporary populism in the region, and three more “controversial” cases in terms of the theoretical applicability of populism as a category of political analysis—Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s Egypt (2014–), Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s Iran (2005–2013), and Benjamin Netanyahu’s Israel (1996–1999, 2009–2021). Although the four cases differ greatly from each other, especially in their varied approaches to democracy, freedom, human rights, and the rule of law, we can still benefit from a comparative perspective of their PFPs. MENA’s PFP must be understood considering the geopolitical background of this region, which includes a combination of internal struggles, military conflicts, and external interventions. The study also highlights the role of civilizational and ethno-religious components in promoting and limiting collective action, as well as the differences in terms of PFP between countries with well-established democratic/authoritarian regimes and between parliamentary/presidential systems.

This edited volume aimed to provide answers to two key questions: what is distinctive about Populist Foreign Policy (PFP), and what are the domestic and international factors that enable and constrain PFP. The answers to these questions are increasingly pressing given the changes in global politics, as demonstrated by the various electoral outcomes of 2022 including the legislative elections in France on June 19 and the Italian parliamentary elections on September 25, which saw important gains among populist parties, and the US legislative elections on November 8, which highlighted the continued strength of Trump’s wing in the Republican Party. These outcomes are not surprising, given that some structural and sociological trends fueling current populism—increased levels of inequality, economic distress, political polarization, the global shift of power away from the West—were accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine and are expected to remain and even grow in the coming years (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2019; Ministero de Defensa Espanol, 2019).

This book aims to introduce readers to the emerging and developing field of populism and foreign policy, highlighting some of the more important scientific advances in the past decade and setting the stage for future contributions to this growing research program. Across its different chapters, this edited volume examines what is distinctive about populist foreign policy (PFP) in parallel to its diversity in cultural, socio-economic, and political terms. Moreover, by exploring how populist governments addressed their foreign policies in Latin America, North America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, the Middle East, East and Southeast Asia, Oceania, and Africa, the book analyzes the domestic and international conditions which enable or constrain PFP in each region.

This chapter explores the foreign policies of populist governments in several countries of Southern Europe, notably France, Greece, Italy, and Spain. These Mediterranean countries show similar characteristics in terms of not only geography, culture, and political system but also a dense presence of populist leaderships with governmental power (or close to having it, in the French case), both from the right and from the left. A comparative analysis of Populist Foreign Policy (PFP) in this sub-region allows us to unravel some of the distinctive ways in which populists shape foreign policy, especially in relation to the EU, and how this is influenced by structural positions in the regional distribution of power and the relative strength of domestic parties and institutions.

This book explores the global phenomenon of populism in relation to states' foreign policy, addressing two key questions: How do populists mold their foreign policies? What are the domestic and external factors that enable and constrain it? To this end, the book brings together a diverse group of scholars who have already researched on populist foreign policies (PFP) in specific countries to contribute shared chapters that examine their drivers, patterns, and effects according to distinctive regions: North America, Western Europe, Southern Europe, Central-Eastern Europe, Latin America, South-East Asia, the Middle East, Oceania, and Africa. The empirical analysis sheds new light on how populists’ distinctive conception of a world divided antagonistically between “the people” and “the elites” influences behaviour towards multilateral organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union, and regional or global hegemonic powers like the United States, Germany, Russia, and China. The book also shows how ideas related to identity, ideology, status and emotions, impinge on populists’ conduct vis-à-vis other international actors, and how national and international structures affect the implementation of populist foreign policies in the regional, interregional, and global arenas. The wide geographical diversity and regional representation are also valuable in identifying cultural similarities and differences. Hence, the findings contribute to lively debates on whether there is a unified and coherent foreign policy among populist leaderships, and whether populism leads to a gradual “corrective” of transnational trends in contemporary politics or, conversely, to a more radical, structural shift in the liberal international order.