This special issue of Intelligence and National Security examines the persistence of strategic surprise and the limitations of existing early warning frameworks in an era of geopolitical volatility. Despite decades of scholarly and institutional focus, intelligence failures continue to occur across tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The articles in this issue offer new theoretical models, empirical analyses, and comparative perspectives that challenge conventional explanations rooted in cognitive bias, organizational dysfunction, or information gaps. By addressing structural, cultural, and methodological dimensions of warning, the volume proposes a more differentiated and adaptive understanding of intelligence failure and the conditions under which it recurs.

Recent times have been hard for global governance, not least for formal intergovernmental organizations (FIGOs). Given changing conditions and their inability to adapt, many observers argue that FIGOs are drifting and losing ground to low-cost institutions (LCIs). We argue that this widespread perception is incomplete and that it dismisses too quickly the durability of FIGOs. We begin by pointing out that not all FIGOs are drifting and that some may even thrive amid transnational crises and power shifts. We then highlight the possibility that in a densely institutionalized global environment, states can substitute one FIGO for another. Thus, even as one FIGO is drifting, other FIGOs, rather than or alongside LCIs, can take the mantle. We identify and exemplify three key motivations for FIGO substitution: overcoming gridlock, enhancing ideological alignment, and policy laundering. During crises and power shifts, some members might paralyze a FIGO, leading to gridlock and prompting other members to cooperate in another FIGO. Power shifts and crises can also motivate dissatisfied FIGO members to pursue parallel activities in a FIGO that better fits their ideological outlook. Policy laundering occurs when members use one FIGO over another to signal political intent. We conclude by exploring the normative implications of FIGO substitution.

This article examines how digital innovation ecosystems have emerged as strategic institutions of power in contemporary world politics. It argues that, unlike Cold War technological rivalries driven by centralized, state-led control, today’s digital competition depends on states’ capacity to orchestrate scalable, multistakeholder ecosystems. Using a cultural–institutional framework, we explain how differences in strategic culture and institutional governance impact the ecosystem’s vitality and performance. A qualitative comparative analysis of the United States, China, and Russia reveals that constructive orchestration, aligning state institutions with generative, commercial-to-national innovation flows, enhances digital leadership, whereas rigid, obstructive governance limits it. This highlights ecosystem governance as a critical dimension of statecraft in the digital age. The findings underscore that the positions of great powers in the global technological hierarchy depend not only on resources or capabilities but also on the effectiveness of ecosystem governance as an evolving instrument of geopolitical power.

Interpersonal diplomatic incidents play a significant role in generating negative interpersonal relations between statespersons. Yet despite the obvious impact on international relations, thus far scholars have not systematically studied interpersonal interactions that have gone astray. In this paper, we discuss such incidents, identifying their causes and consequences. To this end, we collected stories about such incidents from interviews with fifty statespersons, fifteen autobiographies, and high-profile reports in the news media. We then applied the conceptual framework of politeness theory, an approach focusing on the management of social relations, to classify six types of offenses that lead to interpersonal diplomatic incidents: degradation, minimization, marginalization, unfriendliness, uncollegiality, and alienness. We further highlight the potential and actual consequences of these incidents and the factors that can curb their negative impact. In the conclusion we discuss the contribution of our findings to current IR theory, specifically the relational approach and the micro foundations of IR.

This article explores the individual-level effects of an intelligence failure; in particular, on entry-level intelligence analysts. It draws on interviews with graduates of the first class of the IDF Intelligence Directorate’s basic training in intelligence analysis to take place after Hamas’ surprise attack on Israel on 7 October 2023. The article finds that, despite the reputational damage to the Israeli intelligence, the graduates’ motivation to serve in it was not impaired. However, they face significant challenges, chief among them is a heavy sense of responsibility and a terrible fear of failure that may cause either paralysis or alarmism.

Can major cities accommodate the growing political polarization surrounding immigration? Attitudes of city residents toward immigrants vary widely, influenced by factors like urban diversity, labor market dynamics, and cultural identity. While some embrace immigrants as enriching urban life, others view them as threats to culture and economic stability. Using data from three original surveys from Berlin, Barcelona, and Paris (N = 1500), we explore how engagement in urban politics shapes these attitudes, considering national and non-national identities. Results indicate a correlation between political engagement and positive attitudes toward immigrants but also reveal how it can reinforce existing identity-based biases, potentially polarizing urban politics. Our comparative analysis highlights city-specific variations, with Berlin showing favorable attitudes alongside stronger polarization than Paris and Barcelona. These differences possibly stem from urban conditions, such as diversity, capital city status, and pro-immigrant policies. These findings highlight the central role of cities in shaping immigration politics—both as spaces that foster inclusive, a-national affiliations and as battlegrounds where national identity-driven polarization can intensify. In the conclusion, we discuss the implications of these findings for local governments, particularly how cities can respond to the growing political divides.

Kenneth Boulding’s classic book on Stable Peace (1978) provides one of the most powerful and straightforward expositions of the view that a pair or more grouping of states can enjoy vastly different levels of peace. The continuum from war to peace ranges from active warfare to a high degree of cooperation where violence is not even considered as an option for decision-makers in moments of disagreement and conflict; that is, a condition of ‘stable peace.’ Stable peace is not, however, a utopian condition; there is no need for a total harmony of interests between or among the parties involved. The main point is that political and other conflicts that arise between or among states or other actors are consistently resolved without resorting to military means. Thus, war and other types of violence or threats of war are no longer acceptable rational or legitimate means to settle domestic and international conflicts. Almost fifty years later, despite many global changes and tectonic geopolitical shifts, Boulding’s relevance remains paramount to making sense of the state of war and peace throughout the world. Moreover, Boulding’s work has superb heuristic and pedagogical characteristics as an accessible, short textbook to introduce students to the different gradations and dimensions of peace, which transcends the mere absence of war. Thus, Boulding masterly breaks simplistic stereotypes about the characteristics of peace. Besides the intellectual rigor of the book, its plain and understandable language makes the challenges of established positions on sustainable peace easier to grasp.

This study investigates the interactions of forced migrants with state actors in transit countries at critical decision nodal points (DNPs) along their journey—defined as turning points where migrants make decisions about resuming mobility or altering the course of their journey. Granted official legal power by the state, transit state actors operate on the ground in various ways using their power. Nevertheless, their roles in the decision-making as experienced by forced migrants have been studied very little. We examine the journey narratives of forced migrants originating from Eritrea and Sudan. We quantitatively identify and analyze spaces of mobility, immobility and DNPs, within their trajectories. The findings demonstrate that state actors in transit countries can serve as integral and concrete journey components that shape migration outcomes. The study concludes by presenting two insights into (i) the directionality of influence (enabling versus halting journey plans) and (ii) the encounter space (direct-official spaces versus indirect spaces).

Multilateralism is widely contested, with formal intergovernmental organisations (FIGOs) perceived as gridlocked and in decline. This has led to the proliferation of informal intergovernmental organisations (IIGOs) and the fragmentation of global governance. However, existing classifications of FIGOs and IIGOs struggle to account for emanations – second-order international organisations (IOs) created by first-order IOs. This study examines the role of United Nations (UN) emanations in shaping multilateralism, arguing that they can blend formal and informal characteristics, thereby challenging the rigid FIGO–IIGO distinction. Focusing on the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) within the International Investment Agreements (IIA) regime, we demonstrate how these bodies influence multilateralism despite their limited rule-making powers. UNCTAD leverages epistemic authority and inter-organisational collaboration to shape IIA policies, often aligning with Global South priorities. In contrast, UNCITRAL serves as a negotiation hub, enabling the Global North to exert greater influence over investment law. These differences stem from their institutional origins and secretarial capacities. Our findings highlight how emanations advance multilateral cooperation, given their distinct institutional design and member states’ preferences. This study contributes to broader debates on IO authority, formality, and the role of the Global South in global governance.

Does spontaneous contact between individuals from different ethnonational groups affect their social resilience, specifically their ability to avoid escalation and radicalization following eruptions of ethnic violence? To address this question, we conducted a series of studies in mixed Jewish–Palestinian cities and academic settings. Study 1, based on data collected through large-scale online surveys of residents in both mixed and non-mixed cities in Israel (n = 944), reveals that Jewish and Palestinian residents living in mixed cities exhibit higher social resilience than residents of homogeneous cities. This heightened resilience is manifested through more favorable attitudes toward the outgroup and reduced feelings of tension during and following episodes of intercommunal violence. We propose that the underlying mechanism explaining this resilience to the disruptive effects of violence is the higher prevalence of spontaneous intergroup contact enabled in mixed settings compared to more homogeneous ones. This explanation is supported by Study 2, which involved two rounds of surveys completed by Jewish and Palestinian students (n = 6467) at a heterogeneous campus in a mixed city in Israel. The findings demonstrate that positive attitudes toward the outgroup following incidents of intercommunal violence were more durable among students exposed to spontaneous intergroup contact. We discuss the implications of our findings for deepening our understanding of conflict and conflict management in ethnically mixed and conflicted settings.