Why are states rarely expelled from international institutions, even after blatantly defying the principles they were incorporated to uphold? This article examines this puzzle through the case of Russia’s continued membership in key international institutions, including the G7, WTO, G20, the Council of Europe, and the International Space Station, following its 2014 annexation of Crimea and 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Building on existing literature, we develop a three-tiered framework explaining the dynamics influencing the expulsion process, including (1) hegemonic motivation, (2) procedural feasibility, and (3) third-party political support. While the U.S. and or its Western allies viewed Russia’s actions as highly aggressive and as challenging the world order, expulsion was pursued only in select cases where all three conditions were met. Our findings challenge assumptions that informal institutions are inherently more flexible and highlight the enduring constraints of institutional design and multilateral politics. This study contributes to understanding how power, legitimacy, and institutional resilience interact in global governance amid rising geopolitical tensions.

Israel’s 2005 disengagement from Gaza is increasingly remembered as a failed peace initiative. Recently, Israeli commentators have even argued that the policy directly precipitated the Hamas-led attacks of 7 October 2023. Such interpretations are historically inaccurate and are designed to advance the Israeli far right’s contemporary goals in the West Bank and Gaza. The disengagement was never supposed to promote a two-state solution. On the contrary, it sought to freeze the peace process while consolidating Israel’s control over the West Bank. In the event, the disengagement did contain the conflict and entrench the status quo. While current Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu resigned in protest as minister of finance over the disengagement in 2005, he perpetuated its strategic logic after he became prime minister in 2009. This led Israel to 7 October.

The growing political divide between rural and urban regions is often attributed to rural deindustrialization and import competition in manufacturing. Yet this cleavage emerged in many countries well before rural industrialization, pointing to underlying economic forces that existing accounts have overlooked. We argue that comparative advantage in agriculture is one such force: rural voters are more likely to support protectionist parties and policies when local agriculture is uncompetitive, as this sector is often central to their communities' economic and social life. Using a new harmonized dataset of surveys from 127 countries and extensive data on voting behavior, we find strong support for our argument. An additional analysis exploiting exogenous subnational variation in agricultural competitiveness in the United States post-NAFTA further corroborates our findings: The political divide between rural and urban voters is pronounced in uncompetitive regions but negligible in those possessing a comparative advantage in agriculture.

This special issue of Intelligence and National Security examines the persistence of strategic surprise and the limitations of existing early warning frameworks in an era of geopolitical volatility. Despite decades of scholarly and institutional focus, intelligence failures continue to occur across tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The articles in this issue offer new theoretical models, empirical analyses, and comparative perspectives that challenge conventional explanations rooted in cognitive bias, organizational dysfunction, or information gaps. By addressing structural, cultural, and methodological dimensions of warning, the volume proposes a more differentiated and adaptive understanding of intelligence failure and the conditions under which it recurs.

Recent times have been hard for global governance, not least for formal intergovernmental organizations (FIGOs). Given changing conditions and their inability to adapt, many observers argue that FIGOs are drifting and losing ground to low-cost institutions (LCIs). We argue that this widespread perception is incomplete and that it dismisses too quickly the durability of FIGOs. We begin by pointing out that not all FIGOs are drifting and that some may even thrive amid transnational crises and power shifts. We then highlight the possibility that in a densely institutionalized global environment, states can substitute one FIGO for another. Thus, even as one FIGO is drifting, other FIGOs, rather than or alongside LCIs, can take the mantle. We identify and exemplify three key motivations for FIGO substitution: overcoming gridlock, enhancing ideological alignment, and policy laundering. During crises and power shifts, some members might paralyze a FIGO, leading to gridlock and prompting other members to cooperate in another FIGO. Power shifts and crises can also motivate dissatisfied FIGO members to pursue parallel activities in a FIGO that better fits their ideological outlook. Policy laundering occurs when members use one FIGO over another to signal political intent. We conclude by exploring the normative implications of FIGO substitution.

This article examines how digital innovation ecosystems have emerged as strategic institutions of power in contemporary world politics. It argues that, unlike Cold War technological rivalries driven by centralized, state-led control, today’s digital competition depends on states’ capacity to orchestrate scalable, multistakeholder ecosystems. Using a cultural–institutional framework, we explain how differences in strategic culture and institutional governance impact the ecosystem’s vitality and performance. A qualitative comparative analysis of the United States, China, and Russia reveals that constructive orchestration, aligning state institutions with generative, commercial-to-national innovation flows, enhances digital leadership, whereas rigid, obstructive governance limits it. This highlights ecosystem governance as a critical dimension of statecraft in the digital age. The findings underscore that the positions of great powers in the global technological hierarchy depend not only on resources or capabilities but also on the effectiveness of ecosystem governance as an evolving instrument of geopolitical power.

Interpersonal diplomatic incidents play a significant role in generating negative interpersonal relations between statespersons. Yet despite the obvious impact on international relations, thus far scholars have not systematically studied interpersonal interactions that have gone astray. In this paper, we discuss such incidents, identifying their causes and consequences. To this end, we collected stories about such incidents from interviews with fifty statespersons, fifteen autobiographies, and high-profile reports in the news media. We then applied the conceptual framework of politeness theory, an approach focusing on the management of social relations, to classify six types of offenses that lead to interpersonal diplomatic incidents: degradation, minimization, marginalization, unfriendliness, uncollegiality, and alienness. We further highlight the potential and actual consequences of these incidents and the factors that can curb their negative impact. In the conclusion we discuss the contribution of our findings to current IR theory, specifically the relational approach and the micro foundations of IR.

This article explores the individual-level effects of an intelligence failure; in particular, on entry-level intelligence analysts. It draws on interviews with graduates of the first class of the IDF Intelligence Directorate’s basic training in intelligence analysis to take place after Hamas’ surprise attack on Israel on 7 October 2023. The article finds that, despite the reputational damage to the Israeli intelligence, the graduates’ motivation to serve in it was not impaired. However, they face significant challenges, chief among them is a heavy sense of responsibility and a terrible fear of failure that may cause either paralysis or alarmism.

Can major cities accommodate the growing political polarization surrounding immigration? Attitudes of city residents toward immigrants vary widely, influenced by factors like urban diversity, labor market dynamics, and cultural identity. While some embrace immigrants as enriching urban life, others view them as threats to culture and economic stability. Using data from three original surveys from Berlin, Barcelona, and Paris (N = 1500), we explore how engagement in urban politics shapes these attitudes, considering national and non-national identities. Results indicate a correlation between political engagement and positive attitudes toward immigrants but also reveal how it can reinforce existing identity-based biases, potentially polarizing urban politics. Our comparative analysis highlights city-specific variations, with Berlin showing favorable attitudes alongside stronger polarization than Paris and Barcelona. These differences possibly stem from urban conditions, such as diversity, capital city status, and pro-immigrant policies. These findings highlight the central role of cities in shaping immigration politics—both as spaces that foster inclusive, a-national affiliations and as battlegrounds where national identity-driven polarization can intensify. In the conclusion, we discuss the implications of these findings for local governments, particularly how cities can respond to the growing political divides.

Kenneth Boulding’s classic book on Stable Peace (1978) provides one of the most powerful and straightforward expositions of the view that a pair or more grouping of states can enjoy vastly different levels of peace. The continuum from war to peace ranges from active warfare to a high degree of cooperation where violence is not even considered as an option for decision-makers in moments of disagreement and conflict; that is, a condition of ‘stable peace.’ Stable peace is not, however, a utopian condition; there is no need for a total harmony of interests between or among the parties involved. The main point is that political and other conflicts that arise between or among states or other actors are consistently resolved without resorting to military means. Thus, war and other types of violence or threats of war are no longer acceptable rational or legitimate means to settle domestic and international conflicts. Almost fifty years later, despite many global changes and tectonic geopolitical shifts, Boulding’s relevance remains paramount to making sense of the state of war and peace throughout the world. Moreover, Boulding’s work has superb heuristic and pedagogical characteristics as an accessible, short textbook to introduce students to the different gradations and dimensions of peace, which transcends the mere absence of war. Thus, Boulding masterly breaks simplistic stereotypes about the characteristics of peace. Besides the intellectual rigor of the book, its plain and understandable language makes the challenges of established positions on sustainable peace easier to grasp.