In recent years, an increasing number of women have been elected as candidates by radical-right parties. Does this trend toward feminization of the radical right improve the substantive representation of women's interest? Our investigation reveals that instead of moderating their positions on gender roles in response to increased female visibility, radical-right parties have further radicalized their ideology, as evidenced by their parliamentary discourse. We analyze speeches delivered in the European Parliament between 2009 and 2023 by delegates from nine parties, four of which are radical-right. Results show that a higher proportion of women in radical-right parties is associated with their representatives’ greater preoccupation with conservative ideology on gender issues. The article discusses the implications of its findings for the study of gender and anti-democratic politics.

Does spontaneous contact between individuals from different ethnonational groups affect their social resilience, specifically their ability to avoid escalation and radicalization following eruptions of ethnic violence? To address this question, we conducted a series of studies in mixed Jewish–Palestinian cities and academic settings. Study 1, based on data collected through large-scale online surveys of residents in both mixed and non-mixed cities in Israel (n = 944), reveals that Jewish and Palestinian residents living in mixed cities exhibit higher social resilience than residents of homogeneous cities. This heightened resilience is manifested through more favorable attitudes toward the outgroup and reduced feelings of tension during and following episodes of intercommunal violence. We propose that the underlying mechanism explaining this resilience to the disruptive effects of violence is the higher prevalence of spontaneous intergroup contact enabled in mixed settings compared to more homogeneous ones. This explanation is supported by Study 2, which involved two rounds of surveys completed by Jewish and Palestinian students (n = 6467) at a heterogeneous campus in a mixed city in Israel. The findings demonstrate that positive attitudes toward the outgroup following incidents of intercommunal violence were more durable among students exposed to spontaneous intergroup contact. We discuss the implications of our findings for deepening our understanding of conflict and conflict management in ethnically mixed and conflicted settings.

Philosophers have been preoccupied with the future from time immemorial. But for egalitarians, the future of humanity constitutes a relatively new frontier. The premise of this book is that a complaint-based ideal of egalitarianism faces problems when applied to the future. For one thing, if we suppose that future people are destined to fare better than us (say, in terms of overall wellbeing), then allowing humanity to flourish would then represent a net increase in terms of egalitarian complaints. With respect to equality, at least, it would be better to refrain from bringing new life into being. That seems absurd. This is the Anti-Natalist objection to egalitarianism. In addition, any policy aimed at reducing future inequalities, and indeed any population policy at large, will in all likelihood affect the identity of those who will be born. This familiar Non-Identity problem poses unique problems for egalitarianism, especially ones of the complaint-model. Arguably, a person cannot have a complaint (about being worse off than another) when the only other alternative distribution is one in which she does not exist. Put differently, such a person lacks a standing to complain about this future inequality. This can be referred to as the Non-Identity objection or as the Standing objection to egalitarianism. The book thus examines how to evaluate different scenarios for humanity’s future from an egalitarian perspective. It is argued that planning for the future does require egalitarian considerations, but that egalitarianism also needs to be adapted to handle future persons. As indicated, a key challenge concerns how to evaluate mixed populations containing both necessary and possible persons. The book proposes a pluralist approach combining egalitarianism with prioritarianism. Prioritarianism, itself, also suffers unique problems when applied to the future, chief among them the Separateness of Persons objection, and the Super Repugnant Conclusion. The book attempts to deflect these types of obstacles, and aims to develop a coherent framework that maintains egalitarian principles while appropriately discounting the status of merely possible people. Overall, the book seeks to advance both our ethical assessment of humanity’s future and our understanding of the nature of equality (and distributive ethics more generally) itself.

This book illustrates how cities possess unique normative identities, referred to as 'ethoses', and how the residents shape and perceive them. The question of identity and which social relations constitute it has been a central topic in philosophy and social science for centuries. While the state played a key role in shaping identity during the 20th century, its influence has waned in recent years due to market pressures, international agreements, migration, and institutions like the IMF, which limit state autonomy, hence its ability to design policies that sustain and enhance particular, national identities. This collection argues that cities are emerging as new sources of identity, possessing their own "ethoses"—distinctive normative characters. The contributors explore this idea through six cities: London, Qingdao, Tokyo, Mumbai, Istanbul, and Amsterdam. Their analysis draws on extensive document research, personal experiences, urban exploration, and interviews with residents from diverse social, ethnic, and gender backgrounds. This book was originally published as a special issue of Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy.

This paper examines how dominant communities (ethnic or national groups) in divided cities use toponyms (place names) as part of their efforts to establish and maintain various types of political control over urban spaces. To this end, it analyzes an original dataset that includes all the names that the State of Israel, which has been dominated by the Jewish community since its establishment, gave to neighborhoods in West Jerusalem during the periods of the city's post-partition control (1948–1967) and post-unification control (1967–2022), as well as to neighborhoods in East Jerusalem in the latter period. By exploring the formal and informal names given to Jerusalem's neighborhoods in the different periods of Israeli rule, we emphasize the significance of toponymic practices in establishing and maintaining different types of political control in divided cities as well as their practical limitations.

Earlier conceptual studies suggest that policy bubbles differ from the more common pattern of policy overreaction due to their sustained, self-reinforcing nature, which results in prolonged overinvestment. Although the best way to analyze this phenomenon is through rigorous empirical investigation, such future endeavors require a guiding theory. This article lays the groundwork for a potential theory of policy bubbles by differentiating between micro-level causes, such as cognitive, emotional, and social network factors influencing individual behavior (e.g., whether a person’s friends are connected to one another), and macro-level causes, including institutional and ideational factors, as well as social network dynamics at the aggregate level, such as links density or segregation patterns. A similar distinction is made here between micro- and macro-level positive feedback processes, which may evolve independently, interact with one another, and exhaust themselves during the emergence of policy bubbles and in the lock-in stage. This stage is conceived here as a prolonged conflict between policy entrepreneurs who advance distorted or accurate policy images. This conflict at times involves the use of sheer power in authoritarian regimes, while in democratic ones it often entails strategic action by policy entrepreneurs via mutual reinforcement between policy overproduction and various forms of capture—constitutional, technological, cultural, and informational. These mechanisms are used by policy entrepreneurs to block bureaucratic drift, coalition drift, and drift of accountability forums that may lead to a decline in policy overproduction. If this theory results in conclusions that offer sufficient generalizations, it may have a place alongside the major theories of the policy process.

The environmental impacts of infrastructure projects are widely assessed through a procedure known as environmental impact assessments (EIAs). In many regulatory systems, EIAs are carried out by third-party intermediaries. However, their roles and effectiveness within public policy and regulatory governance remain understudied. This study addresses this gap by examining 24 wind energy projects deliberated in Israeli planning committees between 2003 and 2024. Specifically, we ask: (1) What intermediary roles do EIAs and those responsible for their implementation play? (2) What are the strengths and weaknesses of EIAs as an intermediation mechanism? (3) How do these strengths and weaknesses shape their effectiveness? Our analysis identifies five key intermediary roles: two formal roles, which are legally defined—providing advisory services and facilitating enforcement and compliance—and three informal roles, which extend beyond strict regulatory mandates—interpretation, dialogue facilitation, and advocacy. The formal roles ensure compliance with regulatory guidelines and advance environmental expertise, thereby meeting regulatory requirements and contributing to high procedural effectiveness. However, challenges persist, particularly regarding informal roles, which are often influenced by intermediaries’ alignment with developers’ interests. These challenges contribute to relatively low substantive effectiveness, as planning committees frequently find EIAs insufficient for informed decision-making, leading them to seek external consultants for validation. The gap between EIAs meeting regulatory requirements and planning committees’ inability to fully rely on them highlights weaknesses in EIA governance as a mechanism of regulatory intermediation. We argue that formalizing informal intermediary roles with clearer guidelines could improve EIA effectiveness, enhance objectivity, and strengthen decision-making in the EIA framework.

Reading testimonies and diaries of people of ethnic minorities in Amsterdam in the 17^th and 18^th century one cannot but admire Amsterdam for its policies of inclusion, which, actually inspired John Locke when he wrote A Letter Concerning Toleration. And yet, the traumas of the Jews in the Second World War and the Surinamese in the 1970s suggest that this model of inclusion and toleration was unstable and fragile. Indeed, in recent years many Amsterdamers have acknowledged that the city betrayed not only its ethnic minorities but also its own values. The shift in policies of tolerance which characterizes contemporary Amsterdam is interpreted here as a modification of the ethos of tolerance, from tolerance and inclusion based on indifference to tolerance and inclusion based on curiosity. This ethos includes seeing the other as part of one’s own ‘self’, and the ‘self’ as plural, or, as several Amsterdamers told me, ‘hybrid’.

Prior studies suggest that subtle messaging interventions can reduce prejudice by stimulating perspective taking. For instance, there is evidence that reminding citizens of their family’s experiences with displacement can induce empathy toward refugees. We test the generalizability of this treatment in five new studies in Cyprus, Turkey, and Greece and find no evidence that descendants of displaced Turks, Greeks, or Greek Cypriots become more sympathetic toward refugees when a comparison to their own family experiences is drawn. In some cases, they become more hostile. Our study raises doubts about the scalability of this strategy to reduce antirefugee bias. Drawing ingroup-outgroup parallels generates context-specific effects and does not move policy attitudes. We conclude by discussing the practical limitations of light-touch interventions and calling for more research on how prejudice-reduction interventions can be scaled.

Concerns over democratic backsliding have proliferated recently, as elected politicians have sought to undermine democratic checks and balances. This study examines the underpinnings of public support for democratic backsliding, delineating five theoretical explanations: personalistic leadership, affective polarization, populism, majoritarianism, and entanglement with the legal system. We test the explanatory power of these accounts within the Israeli context, leveraging panel survey data collected before and after the government announced its plan to curtail the courts. Results indicate that support for the plan is best explained by two forces: prior attachment to the leader heading the backsliding effort and animosity toward partisan opponents. Notably, populist attitudes are not associated with support for the government's plan. The theoretical framework and longitudinal research design help explain who supports democratic backsliding.