A fundamental question in the social sciences is how collectives of individuals form intelligent judgments. This article tests the hypothesis that genetically-diverse groups make better collective judgments than genetically more homogenous groups. Two studies were conducted (a total of N = 602 participants) in which sets of twins (both monozygotic and dizygotic) were required to perform the task of making numerical judgments. The accuracy of the judgments made by pairs of participants—who were either co-twins (i.e., genetically-related) or were not related—was then compared. The results indicate that the judgments made by unrelated pairs were more accurate than those of the genetically-related twins. Critically, however, this superior performance was found only among monozygotic twins, evidencing the role of genetic relatedness in collective judgment. This research provides the first empirical demonstration of the benefit of genetic diversity for collective judgments, shedding light on the origins of the ‘wisdom of crowds’ phenomenon.

Previous studies have shown that fixations on familiar stimuli tend to be longer than on unfamiliar stimuli, theorized to be a result of retrieval of information from memory. We hypothesize that extended fixations are due to a lesser need to explore an already familiar stimulus. Participant's gaze was tracked as they tried to encode or retrieve a familiar face displayed either alone or alongside other unfamiliar faces. Regardless of the memory task (encoding\retrieval), longer fixation durations were observed when a single familiar face was presented alone, and not when presented among unfamiliar ones. Thus, fixations were not prolonged when it was possible to explore other, unfamiliar stimuli. We conclude that prolonged fixations on familiar stimuli reflect a lesser need to explore an already familiar percept. The results underscore how memory representations influence active sensing, yielding fresh insights into efficient deployment of attention resources. We conclude that fixation durations could be used in applied memory detection tests, preferably together with other measures and when the familiar stimulus is presented alone.

The tactile consequences of self-initiated movements are thought to be predicted by a forward model, yet the precise neural implementation of these predictions remains unclear. In non-motor contexts, expectations are thought to activate sensory neurons tuned towards the expected stimulus. This acts as a predictive template against which afferent sensory input is compared. It is unclear whether forward model predictions have a similar neural instantiation. Here we employed time-resolved multivariate decoding on human electroencephalography (EEG) during self-generated movements to examine the content of predictive neural activity. Human participants performed index finger movements which were predictably paired with a vibration to either the index or ring finger of the opposite, passive hand. On some trials the tactile stimulus was unexpectedly omitted. Results revealed above-chance finger decoding in the pre-movement period supporting a predictive representation of expected stimulation location. As the movement approached, this predictive activity became similar to late-stage processing of a physical tactile stimulus. On omission trials, we found that despite the absence of afferent input, finger location could be decoded ~120 ms after expected stimulus onset. This shows a stimulus-specific omission response. Together these findings indicate that self-generated movement pre-activates neurons tuned towards expected tactile consequences.

Individuals diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) show neural and behavioral characteristics differing from the neurotypical population. This may stem from a computational principle that relates inference and computational dynamics to the dynamic range of neuronal population responses, reflecting the signal levels for which the system is responsive. In the present study, we showed that an increased dynamic range (IDR), indicating a gradual response of a neuronal population to changes in input, accounts for neural and behavioral variations in individuals diagnosed with ASD across diverse tasks. We validated the model with data from finger-tapping synchronization, orientation reproduction and global motion coherence tasks. We suggested that increased heterogeneity in the half-activation point of individual neurons may be the biological mechanism underlying the IDR in ASD. Taken together, this model provides a proof of concept for a new computational principle that may account for ASD and generates new testable and distinct predictions regarding its behavioral, neural and biological foundations.

Objective: To observe ruptures through clients’ and therapists’ experiences of closeness and distance in therapy. Method: Sixty-six clients and their 29 therapists underwent RAP interviews that were rated with the Therapeutic-Distance-Scale- observer version (TDS-O) and completed the Post-Session-Questionnaire (PSQ) three times along therapy (early, mid and late therapy). Using a dyadic model, we associated client and therapist self-report of ruptures with TDS-O observer ratings. Results: Clients’ report of ruptures positively associated with clients’ observed scores that the therapist was too distant, while therapists’ report of ruptures related to their observed scores that the client was too close. Clients report that the rupture addressed related to their higher observed autonomy, but therapists report that the rupture addressed related to less client’s autonomy. Resolution related to lower observed distance and higher observed engagement of both partners. In dyads in which the therapist was rated as experiencing distance, there was a higher level of resolution than in dyads in which the client observed as experiencing distance and the therapist did not. Clinical examples demonstrate how ruptures were manifested and understood through the therapeutic-distance prism. Conclusions: Observing the therapeutic-distance potentially improves therapists’ ability to identify, negotiate, and resolve ruptures.

Comprehensible communication is critical for social functioning and well-being. In psychopathology, incoherent discourse is assumed to reflect disorganized thinking, which is classically linked to psychotic disorders. However, people do not express everything that comes to mind, rendering inferences from discourse to the underlying structure of thought challenging. Indeed, a range of psychopathologies are linked to self-reported disorganized thinking in the absence of language output incoherence. Here we combine natural language processing and computational modeling of free association to detail the relationship between disorganized thinking and language (in)coherence in a large sample of participants varying across different dimensions of psychopathology. Our approach allowed us to differentiate between disorganized thinking, disinhibited thought expression and deliberate creativity. We find evidence for both under-regulated and over-regulated disorganized thinking, which relate to two specific dimensions of psychopathology: self-reported eccentricity and suspiciousness. Broadly, these results underscore the theoretical progress afforded by analyzing latent dimensions underlying behavior and psychopathology.

Background: Intuitively, emotional states guide not only the actions we take, but also our confidence in those actions. This sets the stage for subjective confidence about the best action to take to diverge from the actual likelihood and, clinically, may give rise to over-confidence and risky behaviours during episodes of elevated mood and the reverse during depressive episodes. Whilst computational models have been proposed to explain how emotional states recursively bias perception of action outcomes, these models have not been extended to capture the impacts of mood on confidence. Here we propose a computational model that formalises confidence and its relationship with learning from outcomes and emotional states. Methods: We collected data both in a laboratory context (n=35) and in pre-registered online replication (n=106; https://osf.io/ygc4t). Participants completed a two-armed bandit task, with learning blocks before and after a mood manipulation in which participants unexpectedly received (positive mood induction) or lost (negative mood induction) a relatively large sum of money. Participants periodically reported their decision confidence throughout the task. We examined the extent to which the mood manipulation biased their confidence, predicting that positive and negative moods would lead to over- and under- confidence, respectively. We further predicted that this effect would be stronger in participants with greater propensity towards strong and changeable moods, measured by the Hypomanic Personality Scale. Moreover, we formalized a computational model in which confidence emerges as the difference between the perceived likelihood of reward for the available options. In this model, mood indirectly biases confidence through recursively biased learning of the reward likelihoods for the available options and not from simply shifting overall confidence up or down. Results: In both experiments, we confirmed that moods impacted confidence in the hypothesised direction; absent of any differences in participants9 objective performance, average confidence was higher following positive mood induction, and lower following negative mood induction. This effect was larger in participants with higher levels of trait hypomania. Intriguingly, we found that the effect of mood on confidence emerged in concert with learning. Indeed, whilst the shift in mood was greatest immediately post-mood manipulation and returned to baseline by the end of the learning block, the effect of mood on confidence gradually accumulated over learning trials, peaking at the end of the block. These dynamics were captured by simulations of a 9Moody Likelihood9 model. Empirically, this model simultaneously accounted for the effects of mood on choices, mood states and confidence through a mood bias parameter. Conclusion: We present a unified model in which moods recursively bias reward learning and, consequently, confidence in decision making. Moods fundamentally bias the accumulation of reward likelihood, rather than directly biasing decision confidence. Clinically, these findings have implications for understanding two core symptoms of mood disorder, suggesting that both perturbed mood and confidence about goal-directed behaviour arise from a common bias during reward learning.

Substantial research indicates that individuals with Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) remember more negative information compared to neutral and positive information. This phenomenon is commonly attributed to attentional biases toward negative over neutral and positive information. A recent attentional resources model suggests that in MDD, negative cues not only capture attention, but also lead to deeper processing of subsequent information, irrespective of its content. This study aimed to replicate findings supporting this attentional resources model and go beyond it by investigating the effect of negative cues on encoding and retrieval processes. Forty-one participants with MDD and no comorbid diagnoses, and 42 healthy-controls completed the emotional recall task with negative or positive videos presented during encoding and retrieval stages of a neutral word-list memory test. During encoding, only the MDD group exhibited a difference between negative and positive videos, such that for negative videos memory recall was improved and for positive words it was reduced. Emotional videos had no effect when presented during retrieval. These results suggest that in MDD, encountering emotional cues not only biases retrieval processes toward recalling more negative content, but rather fundamentally alters the depth of information processing, while not leading to a broad-spectrum recruitment of cognitive resources.

Pseudoneglect, considered the archetype of spatial attentional assymetries among neurologically healthy individuals, is traditionally described as a consistent leftward error in visuo-spatial tasks.. Here we challenge this notion by revealing a consistent rightward “internal” bias in a task where participants’ representational encoding of visuo-spatial information is captured. Our meta-analysis across seven experiments in 1750 neurotypical individuals robustly demonstrates a rightward internal bias in the expectations of objects in space. Moreover, we show that this bias is malleable, with a simple behavioural intervention that manipulates prior expectations, albeit with limited generalisability. By successfully recalibrating a spatial bias, our research highlights the potential for cognitive adjustments in addressing spatial cognition challenges such as those in unilateral spatial neglect after stroke.

Objective Therapists’ emotional responses play a significant role in the therapeutic relationship and in the therapy process. The current study examined the associations between therapists’ emotional responses before and after therapy sessions, and patients’ experience of them as attuned and responsive. Method Forty patient-therapist dyads participated in 16 weekly sessions of Supportive Expressive Psychotherapy. Therapists’ emotions were assessed on the Feeling Word Checklist-58. We examined one positive feeling (Parental) and one negative feeling (Inadequate) Following each session, patients and therapists rated responsiveness on the Patient’s Experience of Attunement and Responsiveness. Results Feeling Parental before sessions was associated with patients’ post-session ratings of therapist empathy, but not with session helpfulness or sensed achievement. Therapists’ feelings of inadequacy before sessions were negatively associated with patients’ ratings of helpfulness and achievement, but not with empathy. Therapists’ Parental feelings after the session were positively associated with patients’ ratings and their own ratings on all 3 PEAR subscales. Feeling Inadequate after the session was negatively associated with patients’ ratings of helpfulness, achievement and empathy. Therapists’ ratings were only negatively associated only with helpfulness. Conclusion The study demonstrates that therapists’ emotional reactions play a role in their patients’ experience of their responsiveness.